Sociality, socialities and sociality as a causal force. by Carrithers,  M.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
13 June 2016
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Carrithers, M. (2017) 'Sociality, socialities and sociality as a causal force.', in Human nature and social life :
perspectives on extended sociality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 124-140.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316831908.009
Publisher's copyright statement:
This material has been published in Human Nature and Social Life: Perspectives on Extended Sociality by / edited by
Jon Henrik Ziegler Remme and Kenneth Sillander. This version is free to view and download for personal use only. Not
for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. c© Cambridge University Press 2017
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Sociality, Socialities, and Sociality as a Causal Force 
 
Michael Carrithers 
 
When I agreed to write on sociality for this volume it seemed 
entirely appropriate. Howell has used the concept to great effect, both 
early in her career and recently (Howell and Willis 1989, Howell 2011); 
I used the term as a master key to human nature in general (Carrithers 
1990, 1992, 2001, see also Bird-David 1994); and Marilyn Strathern 
applied the term, with broad and lasting effect, as a solvent to loosen 
crystallised ways of thinking about gender, kinship, personhood, and 
cultural difference (1988, 1996). Here I first look briefly across the 
sprawling territory that has been progressively conquered by 
‘sociality’. It is a view which reveals disparate and sometimes even 
contradictory usages of the term, but also its productive fecundity as 
an anthropological-philosophical keyword. 
Then, second, I will explore ethnographically one possible extension 
of ‘sociality’, or perhaps better, one possibility lying in its conceptual 
heart. I take the core meaning evoked by it, the propensity of beings 
to associate with one another, and push it a step further to argue that 
sociality, thus understood, may on occasion work as a distinct, 
separate and identifiable causal force in our present institutionalising 
human world. I write ‘institutionalising’ to mark one salient trait of 
the human world, its overflowing inventiveness in institutions. The 
ethnographic example I use for anthropological thinking, an institution 
among Buddhist forest monks in Sri Lanka, also suggests how old this 
habit of institutionalising is, and so how pervasive this causal force of 
sociality may be. But please note that I am not only interested here in 
sociality as a propensity for associating with one another as a 
necessary precondition for the creation and maintenance of 
institutions, but also as a powerful causal force which may work 
against institutions and the routine sociality on which institutions 
depend. 
 
The broad brush 
Since the late 1980’s the term ‘sociality’ has taken wing ‘on the 
winds of metaphor’, in the felicitous image applied by Bert O. States 
elsewhere, and has gone from being for anthropologists what he called 
a ‘proto-keyword’ to being a keyword in fact (1996:1). It has taken on 
new meanings, each shaded differently from the next, and finally 
shading off into mutual contradiction. This is to a degree 
problematical, for we scholars and scientists tend to assume a solidity 
and rootedness in our words, a singleness of meaning, to support 
mutual intelligibility among us. But to insist too much on this 
univocality would be to miss the richness in (sociocultural) 
anthropologists’ understanding of one another, a richness depending 
less on a repertoire of hard-edged terms than on softer resonances 
which may be called up by the use of a term or image among an 
already learned and knowledgeable readership. 
The idea itself, pared back to its absolute minimum as the 
propensity to associate with fellow beings, says little explicitly, but 
therein lies its strength, for like other such abstractions, its very 
generality invites filling with meaningful and detailed content. 
Moreover, as a (very) abstract concept, sociality allows users to gather 
together many otherwise differing particularities and so to establish a 
view over a wide field. In that respect sociality possesses what Hans 
Blumenberg called a ‘Zu-Viel’ (Blumenberg 2007:17), a ‘too-much’, a 
powerful capacity to capture much, but also potentially to capture 
more than may have originally been meant. And therein lies its 
weakness as well. Blumenberg’s analogy with a trap captures this 
ambivalence nicely: you could decide to apply your powerful rabbit 
trap in order to catch hedgehogs instead, and that is well and good; 
but you may also aim only to catch rabbits, and end up with a 
hedgehog you didn’t want. Abstracts as useful as sociality tend to 
accrete more and more meanings and phenomena by their seductive 
plasticity, and then by the sheer fact of their use by more and more 
people. 
In this respect sociality has followed — though more modestly — the 
course much earlier taken by ‘culture’. Culture began life for 
anthropologists as a singular abstract noun with no plural: thus E.B. 
Tylor wrote of it as a single entity of which different peoples might 
have different amounts. Franz Boas coined a plural for the word, and 
so offered a way of talking about what (American, cultural) 
anthropologists would study when they did fieldwork. Then time 
passed, ‘cultures’ were routinely studied, but ‘culture’ was also 
theorised this way and that, and in the midst of this process Geertz 
found reason to designate it a ‘conceptual morass’. He used as prime 
example Clyde Kluckhohn’s giving it more than eleven different 
definitions (Geertz 1973:4). But it is notable, too, that in the next 
paragraph Geertz went on to offer his own definition, namely the 
famous one of culture as the ‘webs of significance’ in which ‘man’ is 
suspended. Only recently have anthropologists sought to abandon the 
concept of culture, but there, still, the concept itself, however 
distended and weakened, hangs over the apparently new term 
‘ontology’, and the interpretative practices that anthropologists 
applied under the heading of ‘culture’ continue serenely under 
‘ontology’ (see Venkatesan et al. 2010).   
‘Sociality’ has not been among anthropologists nearly as long as 
‘culture’, nor has it been used nearly so widely, so it has not yet 
produced a morass, but it has at least managed what might look like a 
small murky puddle. Sociality followed the career of culture in that it 
began as a singular term (Strathern 1988, Carrithers 1992) but went on 
to become a plural (e.g. Gibson and Sillander 2011), there referring to 
the different ways of being social in different societies/scenes. And it 
has produced contradictions. Thus we have Howell, writing currently, 
designating sociality as  an ‘innate, presumably genetically inscribed 
predisposition in all human beings’ to be keenly aware of, and 
responsive to, one another (Howell 2011: 43). In that version of 
sociality, this intense intersubjectivity with other human beings is of 
interest as a trait of our species alone. Yet we also have Tsing (2013), 
writing at practically the same time, making a good case for ‘more-
than-human’ sociality to include associations between humans and 
fungi and other entities of the plant kingdom. And Moore (2013) writes 
of possible ‘socialities of the inorganic’, which would include humans 
with machines.  
Each of these expansions of the term bears its own more or less 
defensible rhetorical logic, and the consequence is, for good or ill, 
that it is necessary to follow that rhetoric back to its source to 
discover the sense of ‘sociality’ meant: we cannot read the term as 
lucid in itself. Thus, for example, Tsing’s use of ‘sociality’ depends on 
beginning from one of sociality’s possible entailments, namely that 
those beings included within the same sphere of sociality are of 
heightened importance to one another, compared to beings which fall 
outside that sphere; and so by promoting trees and fungi to partners in 
sociality with humans, we also promote the importance of those 
otherwise unprivileged beings. Hence what might appear at first as a 
purely descriptive abstract term, sociality as a property of beings 
which associate with one another, becomes in this usage a moral and 
prescriptive property. And in this case that rhetorical move is 
bolstered by a larger climate — how appropriate a word! — within 
which anthropologists have found it ever more urgent to see our 
species as entwined, dangerously, disastrously, with our larger world.    
 
Sociality-e 
So there is no single compelling logic in the usages of sociality, but 
rather a rhetorical potential which may be realised in various ways 
(and please note that the term ‘rhetorical’ is not pejorative). 
Nevertheless, there are roughly two domains into which the concept 
has expanded among sociocultural anthropologists. One is that of 
sociality as a general trait of human beings, in contrast to the sociality 
of other species. It is this term that I want to use later in my particular 
case study, in which I detect a feature in human beings’ sociality which 
delivers a marked causal force. This general trait I will call for the 
moment sociality-h, for ‘human’. 
The second sphere sits within sociocultural anthropology and faces 
toward the particular interests and obsessions of sociocultural 
anthropologists. This is the version of sociality pioneered largely by 
Marilyn Strathern (1988, 1996), who used the concept to cut through 
existing knots in anthropologists’ collective representations of gender, 
personhood, kinship, and social organisation. Her usage contrasted two 
things: on one hand, anthropologists’ existing terminology as an 
expression of Western folk sociology; and on the other, the practices 
and folk sociology of peoples in Melanesia. This usage soon lent itself 
to comparing differing versions of sociality. Hence I will call this 
‘sociality-e’, for ‘ethnographic’, to designate its potential as a 
comparative ethnographic tool. This usage has slipped easily from 
sociality singular to socialities plural, just as ‘culture’ slipped to 
‘cultures’. Insofar as sociality-e has become routinised as a term of 
art, it is characteristically applied in the study of peoples with little 
hierarchical ranking or differential access to resources, such as those 
in Melanesia as characterised by Strathern (1988), in Amazonia (e.g. 
Overing and Passes 1998, McCallum 2001), or at the peripheries of 
states in Southeast Asia (Gibson and Sillander 2011). Sociality-e is 
especially useful — and has been especially exciting — because it puts 
aside such standard categories as ‘society’, ‘kinship’, or ‘social 
structure’, or standard oppositions such as individual vs. society, 
politics vs. domesticity, or female vs. male as biological or natural 
kinds, for all those ideas are imported from Our ‘Western’ scene. 
Sociality-e looks instead to whatever happens between people to 
create their distinctive life and forms of personhood. The reward has 
been to reveal those processes with greater fidelity, so that we can 
see more deeply into the intense and continual exchange of Melanesia, 
the blending of marked personal autonomy with mutual solidarity in 
peripheral Southeast Asia, or the conviviality of everyday life in 
Amazonia, and in any case this understanding of sociality helps to 
clarify the specific form that gender may take on one scene or 
another. But there has been a more general effect as well. First, 
sociality-e can be used to show how specific forms of person both 
create, and are created in, the inflected moment of interaction; and 
second, it encourages a focus on the evanescent but vitally important 
matter of interaction as a site of constant fecund motility which 
routinely produces both the new and the routine in social life. 
Sociality-e has not been used to characterise highly hierarchical 
societies with differential access to resources, an extreme division of 
labour, and a plethora of different institutions, and in fact it has been 
the contrast against such societies which has been important in the 
development of sociality-e. This is so in part because sociality-e arose 
in the study of societies with little ranking or differential access to 
material or cultural resource, but also because it was designed from 
the very beginning as an ethnographic tool for small scale settings 
where kinship, micropolitics, personhood and provisioning are 
indissolubly wedded together and cannot usefully be distinguished into 
separate institutions. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that sociality-e 
can also be applied as a guiding idea in the study of lesser scenes set 
within highly differentiated and institutionalised societies, scenes 
which are strictly limited and relatively egalitarian, such as electronic 
interactions-at-a-distance by people sharing a common interest (Long 
2013), solidarity within a highly differentiated and conflictual order 
(Lazar 2013), or townspeople gathered for a shared aesthetic 
experience (Vergunst and Vermehren 2013). 
  
Sociality-h 
Sociality-h has quite a different history and significance. Its basic 
sense is just what Signe Howell suggested, namely a general inherited 
propensity of human beings to engage responsively and intensely with 
one another. However, the idea can be elaborated (Carrithers 1992, 
2001) so as to answer two questions, and these questions are both 
quite different from the question/problem which sociality-e answered. 
The first is this: how does human sociality, sociality-h, resemble, and 
how does it differ from, the sociality of other species, notably that of 
other social primates? The purpose of opening the concept in that 
direction is straightforward: to find a conceptual language that might 
allow fruitful discussion between a sociocultural anthropology 
predicated on the uniqueness of the human species and an 
evolutionary anthropology, and especially primatology, predicated on 
the similarity of the human species to other species. The neighbouring 
usages of the concept of sociality, especially in primatology, are 
highly, and increasingly, sophisticated, and a comparison of their 
usages with ours might now be mutually illuminating.  
But for the present I concentrate on the second question raised by 
sociality-h, which was directed inward, to sociocultural anthropology, 
just as sociality-e was. But where sociality-e envisioned 
anthropologists’ problem to arise in the description and understanding 
of societies — or perhaps I’d better say: scenes — whose history is 
usually difficult to discern, sociality-h was addressed to a problem 
arising most visibly in the study of complex societies, societies which 
have a salient and investigable history of social and cultural change 
(and which, for that matter, possess multiple socialities-e within their 
smaller scenes, such as are found among the vastness of India, or 
China, or Europe, etc.). The problem was this: how can we account in 
general for the fact that social and cultural change are endemic 
throughout these — but in fact throughout all — versions of human life? 
And that phrase ‘account in general’ was meant to connect this facet 
of human sociality with the facet looking to evolutionary comparison. 
For from this perspective what is interestingly unique about our 
species is that its social forms constantly metamorphose such that we 
constantly create new social and cultural forms. Given that mutability, 
the sociality of our species consists not in one specifiable form of 
social arrangements, but rather in the plastic potential for a huge 
range of differing social organisations.  
That potential can best be described as a set of cognitive and 
affective capacities which are, summed together, unique to our 
species. I gave one earlier account of these capacities (Carrithers 
1992, 2001), and writers including Enfield and Levinson (2006), Toren 
(2013) and Tomasello (2014), have written more recently, and in 
different vocabularies, of those matters. For my purposes here, I re-
describe our human sociality, though in terms which I believe to be 
consistent with those accounts. Sociality comprises: 
1) The propensity to associate intensely and continuously with 
conspecifics. 
2) An ability to direct each other’s attention not only to a present 
object or topic, but also to an imagined, projected or remembered 
topic.  
3) An ability to represent that imagined, projected or remembered 
topic in detail, an ability which reaches so far as to weave complex 
narratives of the soap opera of social life, as it has been, is, or might 
be.  
4) An ability to engage each others such that we collude in a joint 
interpretation of what has passed and/or in a joint imagining of a 
present or a projected future.  
5) An ability to perform mutually in line with such imaginings, and 
in so doing to institute joint action among a company of persons to 
some more or less enduring end. 
6) The ability to create and adopt different, and new, forms of 
interaction and bodily habitus, and therefore new forms of social 
organisation and behaviour. 
I mean this (re-)description of human sociality to underpin one of 
the things we seem to be able to do so well, and that is, we create 
institutions. In principle a full description of this version of sociality, 
sociality-h, would be both evolutionary and historical. It would be 
evolutionary in the sense that it would distinguish a process of natural 
selection which laid down a groundwork of that institutionalising 
potential. It would be historical, though, in that it would also show 
how we have also produced, and used, culturally transmissible tools — 
among them skills of engaging one another, forms of speech and 
gesture, and a repertoire of symbolic representations — all of which 
are fundamental to the persuading, teaching, and moving rhetorical 
work of creating institutions.  
But in any case even a casual survey of our present world lavishly 
illustrates our human genius for creating institutions. Each of us may, 
in a single day, move through a wide range of institutions, from home 
to school to place of business to place of worship to voluntary 
organisation. We may act as patient to a doctor in one sort of 
institution or customer to a salesperson in another. There are far less 
differentiated institutional settings found elsewhere and elsewhen: 
think, for example, of Pueblo Amerindians of the US Southwest, with 
their long-established and elaborate sacred societies, whose 
performances are so sharply marked off from performances in everyday 
social experience; or of the cargo cults of Melanesia, where we can at 
least discern some account of the institutions’ origins. And if we came 
to the Chewong studied by Howell, we might speculate that they have 
invented but one institution, namely Chewong society itself.  
Some institutions are relatively short-lived, such as student 
societies which arise, flourish for perhaps a year or two, until their 
enthusiasts graduate, and then disappear. Others have much greater 
longevity. The Buddhist Sangha, the Order of monks, to which I now 
turn, has persisted in one form or another for well over two millennia.  
 
Another broad brush 
The case I present concerns an institution among the Sangha in Sri 
Lanka, the Śrī Kalyāṇī Yogāśrama Saṃsthāva, which I will translate as 
the Sri Kalyani Hermitage Institute, hereinafter the Institute. The 
Institute was founded in 1951 and flourishes still today. The material I 
present here, though, derives mostly from the period 1972-1975 (as 
laid out in detail in Carrithers 1983).  
First, though, I sketch the background. The Sangha, the Buddhist 
Order of monks, is understood to be descended from those who first 
joined the Buddha after his enlightenment, so that, in principle at 
least, there is an unbroken line of celibate monks, each generation 
ordained by its predecessors, stretching back to his time. Its purpose is 
understood to be twofold, to preserve and transmit the teachings of 
the Buddha to both monks and laity, and to train its members in 
discipline and self-cultivation through meditation so that they may 
attain release from the cycle of worldly suffering. These purposes are 
served in part by a detailed code for the monks’ behaviour, even down 
to the level of posture and style of movement, and particularly by the 
provision that they hold few worldly goods and gain their livelihood 
through mendicancy. The very word for monk in the ancient Pali 
language is bhikkhu, meaning ‘beggar’, though the understanding is 
not that the monks are passive objects of mere charity, but rather that 
they offer teaching (=preaching) of the Buddha’s discoveries to the 
laity, in exchange for material support, and members of the Sangha 
have always been treated by the laity with elaborate honour, often in 
the idiom of respect shown by commoners to nobility or royalty.  
As the Sangha’s history unfolded — and indeed from very early on — 
it emerged that there was a logic in this situation that played out to 
produce similar results again and again (I write chiefly of the 
Theravadin world, the Buddhism of Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka). 
First, the two purposes, self-cultivation on the one hand and 
transmission of the teaching on the other, turned out to be, to a 
degree at least, contradictory. The preservation, promulgation, and 
especially the more or less ceremonial use of the Buddha’s teachings 
became, for many, their chief or only concern. This fact is recognised 
in various designations in the texts for monks as ‘preachers’ as opposed 
to ‘ascetics’, ‘village-dwellers’ versus ’forest-dwellers’, or devoting 
themselves to ‘book duty’ as opposed to ‘meditation duty’. The 
preachers and village-dwellers, probably the vast majority of monks 
throughout Sangha history, came to be a constituent of (in this case) 
Sri Lankan agrarian society, such that their ‘book duty’ amounted in 
effect to playing a ritual role with respect to the laity. In this respect 
in might seem reasonable to translate the Sinhalese term for these 
functionaries as ‘priests’, but the idea, and to a degree the practice, 
of asceticism and religious poverty still adheres to them, at the very 
least as a position from which they may be routinely criticised as less 
than ideal, so I will stick with ‘monks’. Sinhalese Buddhists are today 
keenly aware of the distinction to be made between ‘forest monks’ as 
a category — those devoted to meditation and to the strictest 
observance of monastic discipline — and common village monks. 
Second, the logic of treating monks in the idiom of aristocracy or 
royalty, though meant in principle to show respect for their spiritual 
heroism as ascetics and representatives of the highest human values, 
possessed other fertile possibilities as well, namely that they might 
become recipients, not only of the quotidian needs of food, clothing 
and shelter, but also of land, itself transferable wealth in a more or 
less feudal agrarian social order. And since a gift of land in such 
circumstances also entailed a gift of those who till the land and 
produce the wealth, the Sangha became lords in fact as well as in 
metaphor.   
 I have used the term ‘domestication’ to describe this large package 
of what Weber called ‘unintended consequences’, for it captures the 
sense in which the Sangha began as a more or less itinerant body of 
people ‘gone forth from home into homelessness’ — so it is 
represented in the earliest texts — but ended in Sri Lanka as routine 
and sedentary institution and a settled constituent of the Sinhalese 
polity. Viewed from the top down, there were populous and well-
provisioned monastic establishments in the various Sinhalese capitals 
throughout history — Anuradhapura, Polonnaruva, Kandy — which 
received largesse from, and in turn legitimated, the royal and 
aristocratic hegemony. It is somewhat harder to see how this looked 
from the bottom up, at least over the millennia I am sketching here, 
but certainly within the colonial period and afterwards the Sinhalese 
view of a proper village is one with its own resident monks, their 
residence, and an accompanying temple with Buddha image (though 
there have been many settlements, especially among lower castes and 
the poor, and those in remote areas, that have not enjoyed these 
amenities). 
 
The Institute gets started 
Which takes us to the year of Sri Lanka’s (then Ceylon’s) 
independence in 1948, which was strongly associated with the 
approaching 2500th anniversary of the founding of Buddhism itself, to 
be celebrated in 1956. Among the many voices raised by this 
symbolically and rhetorically fertile conjunction was that of the 
Venerable Kadavädduve Jinavamsa, who at first wrote at first to the 
press, then broadcast over Radio Ceylon, calling for a revival of 
Buddhism in general and a renewal of the original Sangha’s principles 
and practices in particular. 
For in fact the village Sangha in which he was raised since childhood 
was one which was thoroughly domesticated (in my sense of the term). 
Many temples possessed productive land and large and comfortable 
monks’ dwellings. Jinavamsa himself was called to be a monk, so to 
speak, when he was ten years old; but that call issued, not from an 
inner voice, but from an uncle whose monastic property the child was 
meant eventually to inherit. Most monks were considerably better fed 
than those around them. In response to these creature comforts, the 
monks were understood mainly as officiants on ceremonial occasions. 
In general these occasions are called ‘merit-making’ (pinkam), the 
underlying idea being that lay people accrue spiritual merit, for 
themselves or for loved ones, by their sacrifice of goods to support the 
monks. These occasions might include a sermonising when receiving 
their meal, or even just a few words of spiritual advice when accepting 
some goods to be used at the temple. More formal merit-making occurs 
when officiating at funerals (but not other life-crisis rituals) or 
presiding at pirit ceremonies. These last could be simple affairs of a 
few hours or indeed a vastly expensive affairs in which a well to do 
family of laity invited people from round about to attend and receive 
both generous cooking and the auspicious influences of the Buddha’s 
teachings, chanted in a musical form (and in its original language, Pali, 
incomprehensible to the laity). Pirit might be conducted through a 
long night or even over several nights by many monks, and the monks 
might be seated in a more or less expensively decorated temporary 
ceremonial structure. From the lay point of view, such outlay is meant 
to purchase an auspicious beginning — for a newborn child, or a 
newborn business, or a dangerous journey, say —, or to fend off 
misfortune in its many manifestations, whether present or feared. 
From many monks’ point of view, the ability to lay on a fitting pirit 
performance would be the height of their vocational achievement. 
So this more or less propertied Sangha which Jinavamsa criticised 
was in fact necessary to the conduct of proper Sinhalese Buddhist 
village life. Yet alongside the general awareness of the indispensable 
role the Sangha plays there also exists a common trope in Sinhalese 
discussion of religious affairs that the Sangha as it exists is woefully 
short in monastic discipline and learning but keen to defend its wealth 
and comforts. I heard this awareness expressed in many ways, but the 
most succinct critique was that of an English-speaking layman who 
said, ‘when I worship [a monk], I worship the robe [that is, the Sangha 
as it should be], not these rogues and buggers’ (‘rogues and buggers’ 
being a phrase for miscreants and villains).  
Jinavamsa wrote in a far more elevated style, but his published 
critique was vividly expressive of both the current corrupted character 
of the Sangha and of the ideal character of the Sangha as originally 
laid out by the Buddha. The Sangha’s role, as he said to me, reprising 
what he said to the nation at large, should be that of a lantern, 
lighting the way by example to a moral form of life among the laity 
and a disciplined and meditative way of life among the monks. By 1950 
he had begun to turn this critique into action by collecting support for 
an active reform. By 1951 Jinavamsa founded the Institute, and by 
1956, that highly charged year for Sinhalese Buddhists, the Institute 
was well established and flourishing, and continued thereafter as an 
intentionally limited, small but healthy and firmly principled 
expression of a monk’s way of life, a way of life which remains largely 
at odds with the practices of much of the routine village Sangha round 
about. 
 
Sociality as a ground for institutionalising 
The story of that development is laid out in detail in Carrithers 
1983. It was certainly a remarkable achievement and a tribute to 
Jinavamsa’s imagination, eloquence, energy and strength of character, 
but I will not recount those events here. Rather, I will touch on those 
features in the development of the Institute that give flesh to the 
bones of the particular construction I wish to give to the concept of 
sociality here. I reserve for the moment discussion of the first 
characteristics of sociality laid out above, namely the 1) the propensity 
to associate with conspecifics, for that is more the cap of my argument 
than the base. And I will pass over the second, 2) the ability to direct 
others’ attention, because much of the interest there lies in the 
ontogeny, in childhood, of sociality’s more complex features. 
Feature 3) is the ability to weave even very complex stories of a 
past, present and/or future. I (and others) have written of this 
narrative capacity insofar as it enables the creation of some sense of 
order in the midst of the constant complexity, uncertainty and motility 
of human social life. What I want to remark on here is the sheer scale 
of the narrative, and so of the company of characters that inhabit it. In 
the first place there is a ‘we’ who were implicit, and often explicit, 
protagonists in Jinavamsa’s narrative, namely Buddhist Sinhalese as a 
whole. This is a story similar to other stories of accomplished 
nationalism in our world of nationalisms, of Benedict Anderson’s 
‘imagined communities’ which stretch so far beyond the immediate 
face-to-face world of any given sociality-e. And that sense of imagined 
others stretches back 2500 years to the founding of Buddhism in India, 
a temporal scale which comprehends as well an idealised and enduring 
Sangha, living across those centuries and still vibrantly important as 
characters placed against whatever vices any present and actually 
experienced members of the Sangha may offer. We can say this as well 
of Jinavamsa’s narrative, namely that it is not only spaciously imagined 
and capable of placing present persons in a far larger frame, but also 
that, by its contrast of the desirable and the actual, it is capable of 
projecting a possible future as well. 
Feature 4), colluding in a joint imagining of a situation, recognises 
the effective rhetorical force which may be achieved by one such as 
Jinavamsa addressing his narrative of the situation to the others whom 
he wishes to involve. It is notable, true, that his eloquence was borne 
by mass media, newspapers and then radio. Such media support and 
enhance the persuasive force of nationalism, as Benedict observed. But 
more to the point, the creation of the Institute required the 
recruitment of both lay supporters and monks. The lay supporters 
would be those willing to fund the building and provisioning of 
monasteries devoted to Jinavamsa’s vision, and the monks those 
willing to put themselves and their future lives in his (and his fellows’) 
hands. The first to respond was a well-to-do layman, who offered the 
considerable resources of his family’s fortune to the purchase of land 
and the building of a first monastery. Subsequently other wealthy 
people, but also associations here and there of poorer but enthusiastic 
lay supporters, came forward to offer their resources. It is especially 
remarkable that many of these knew of Jinavamsa only through Radio 
Ceylon or the newspapers; so in effect his eloquence reached out to 
total strangers to draw them in to a joint imagining. Similarly, the first 
large tranche of novices-to-be were recruited through a newspaper 
advertisement. 
Here I want to mark, not some causal role played by the media, and 
indeed Jinavamsa’s achievement depended also on word of mouth 
which reached beyond his immediate sphere. Rather, I am concerned 
with the capacity of an imagining, however conveyed, to lay the 
ground for collusion beyond the sphere of those already personally 
known face-to-face. Given the right circumstances, our human 
sociality connects beyond immediate experience, and beyond our 
known fellows, such that people can not only agree with distant 
others, but can also jointly act with those others — my feature number 
5) — to realise a common project. 
Feature 6), the capacity to adopt — in this case, in adulthood — new 
forms of relating and new forms of behaviour, is the necessary ground 
for the Institute’s final success. For the full form of monastic life 
envisioned by Jinavamsa and his colleagues, and of relations to the 
laity, were sufficiently unlike the routines then expected of monks and 
laity that they amounted to what one opponent — and there were 
many opponents to Jinavamsa and his colleagues — called ‘an alien 
way of working’. Though the rhetoric of the Institute was based 
thoroughly on the past as still preserved in (mostly unread) texts, the 
reality in the present was that they were laying out a largely 
unfamiliar approach. This included not only the revival of the full 
range of prescribed monastic life, but also the revival of the highly 
circumscribed relations between monks and laity. Thus, as a minor 
example, I witnessed a family who brought some kerosene, honey and 
fresh fruit to offer to Jinavamsa one afternoon. They had come to 
offer merit for a child who had died. He told them that he could 
accept the honey and kerosene, because they are allowed to be kept, 
but he could not accept the fruit, as monks are not to receive solid 
food after noon. They were puzzled and remonstrated that they 
routinely gave such gifts to their local monk. Jinavamsa replied that 
nevertheless that is the rule, and that they could anyway give the fruit 
to the lay helpers in the kitchen to make juice. Such encounters have 
been multiplied across many issues in the history of the Institute, and 
mark how different their institutional style is from the surrounding 
monastic culture. 
So there is what might be called the routinely remarkable sociality 
that the Institute and its founding bring to light — a sociality that 
might interestingly bear comparison with that of our fellow primates. 
Given the circumstances, we may begin to socialise with far-off people 
we have never met before, and enter into new relations of trust and 
mutual collusion with relative strangers; we may undertake to invent 
and cultivate new forms of organisation and new styles of relationship: 
and we may, in mid-life, undertake voluntarily to live wholly with 
strangers, and to conduct ourselves within novel styles of behaviour, 
all so different from our natal styles and persons that we in effect 
move into a different world. In the case of the Institute’s newly 
ordained monks, it amounts to joining what Goffman called a ‘total 
institution’.  
But note, too, that such detachment from one scene and 
attachment to another, though it is played out dramatically by the 
monks and supporters of the Institute, is nevertheless but one version 
of a kind of change that is much more widespread among our species. 
For in that respect many others, for example, migrants, traders, and 
indeed ethnographers likewise leave behind intimately familiar worlds 
to plunge into new ones in the pursuit of their various projects.  
 
Sociality as a force in itself 
In these respects sociality amounts to no more than a potential for 
association, a native propensity in our species that can be manipulated 
and cultivated to create our huge variety of organisational forms. 
There is, however, another side to sociality, demonstrated richly in the 
founding and organisation of the Institute, that is not nearly so 
congenial to the founders’ purposes.  
To understand that, let me return for a moment to the role of the 
Sangha as a constituent of fully formed social life in Buddhist Sri 
Lanka, and that is its role in merit-making. On one hand, merit-making 
does possess a rationale, in that the act of giving to the monks 
produces merit, a sort of spiritual good which may be applied either to 
the merit-maker herself, in that it may help or protect some future 
project or life, or it may be transferred to a loved one for their 
benefit, and often for a loved one who has passed away, that they 
might prosper as they move into their next life. That rationale, 
however, does not quite capture the sense of intimacy and visceral 
importance that merit-making may have for a lay person. To capture 
that, we might better think of merit-making as a rightful, 
praiseworthy, and necessary accompaniment to one’s anxious concern 
for the well-being of oneself and one’s family at moments of actual or 
foreseeable crisis. The effort and goods sacrificed are sacrificed to the 
monks for the monks’ well-being, of course, but are sacrificed on 
behalf of one’s loved ones and their well-being, and in that respect the 
focus is far less on the monks than on the loved ones themselves. So 
the family mentioned earlier, who brought the fruit and other gifts to 
Jinavamsa, were dealing less with him than than with the dead child 
and their own crisis.  
So there is a powerful and perennial demand for monks, any monks, 
to provide these services. The situation, though, is not quite that 
simple. On one hand, the demand is for monks to provide the services 
in a way conformable to the laity’s expectations. In this respect the 
family would have been better off giving to the monk back home, who 
would have accepted the gifts without demur, rather than to 
Jinavamsa. On the other hand, forest monks are especially desirable 
recipients, since they are particularly virtuous and therefore especially 
meritorious vessels for merit-making. So to a considerable degree 
forest monks are victims of their own virtue, in that they are in high 
demand. They become objects of what Gananath Obeyesekere once 
called ‘the relentless piety of the masses’ (personal communication).  
This circumstance was advantageous to the Institute, of course, in 
that lay support was, after a certain point, more or less readily 
forthcoming. Yet it exposed the monks to a pressure which was often 
inconsistent with their mission. The consequences of this pressure 
were plentifully demonstrated in the first years of the Institute’s 
founding, because Jinavamsa found, on several occasions, that he and 
his colleagues were compelled to sever their connection with a 
monastery, and sometimes one purpose-built for them and in 
circumstances threatening the very existence of the Institute. For even 
though he was at pains to explain to supporters the rules under which 
the Institute operates (rules largely given by the ancient monastic 
code, but it some cases enhanced by their own regulations) 
nevertheless the local laity in one place or another refused to accept 
those limitations, since they were accustomed to monks who made 
themselves freely available well beyond the then disused and more or 
less forgotten monastic code. 
It is in this general situation, this tension, that my attention was 
first drawn to the potential of sociality to be not just a propensity or 
potential which could be realised through institutions, but in fact a 
separate causal force in its own right. Here is what happened. In the 
course of its expansion, the Institute came to have about forty 
monastery / forest hermitages, among which about one hundred monks 
were distributed. This meant that, in practice, many of the hermitages 
sheltered only one or two monks, while some of the larger sites would 
shelter considerably more. It was relatively easier for a larger 
concentration of monks to adhere strictly to the code, but when 
exposed in ones or twos, experience showed that it was more difficult. 
And indeed it turned out that, when a monk was exposed for a matter 
of many months or a few years to the demands of the local laity, there 
was a marked tendency for the monk increasingly to give in to lay 
demands, and so for monastic discipline to suffer (though not so much 
by serious breach as by the falling away from many minor rules and the 
encroachment on solitude and meditation). As this circumstance 
dawned on Jinavamsa and his colleagues, they realised that they would 
have to find an answer, and they did so. They found that, if they 
transferred monks relatively frequently from one hermitage to 
another, this situation, a disastrous one in their eyes, could be 
avoided. Thus one monk pupil of Jinavamsa, Gunananda, who was 
among that first intake of aspirants who answered the newspaper ad, 
had lived in a total of eighteen different hermitages in the twenty-five 
years he had spent in the Institute when I talked to him. 
 Jinavamsa, and indeed Gunananda, were very clear about how this 
would come about in most cases. For it would usually be far less the 
attractions of some material goods or comforts for the offending monk, 
but rather more a matter of a growing affection between the monk 
and his local lay supporters. Or as a monk in a different setting put it, 
it would come about by an inappropriate excess of compassion — one 
of the cardinal Buddhist virtues — on the part of the monk, in that he 
would be responding to the visceral needs of the laity as they dealt 
with the vicissitudes of life through merit-making. So, as a minor 
example, the Institute’s own rules would not allow monks to 
participate in an all-night pirit ceremony, but a lay family dealing with 
a major crisis or turning point might wish to recognise that occasion 
with that more elaborate form of merit-making. 
 There is, however, a much larger point to be made here, and it 
might best be made using the social phenomenological vocabulary of 
Alfred Schütz. He differentiated between two ways of experiencing 
others in social life. On one hand, there are those with whom we ‘grow 
old together’, who are part of our ‘onrolling’ life. These are our more 
or less intimate friends, family and neighbours, whose idiosyncrasies, 
stories, hopes and fears we know and perhaps share. These he called 
Mitmenschen, which I will translate as ‘familiars’ (this term has 
elsewhere been translated as ‘consociates’). On the other hand there 
are those whom we know only distantly and largely as types, people 
with whom we can relate, if necessary, according to a more or less set 
script: I know X as a doctor, and know how to act when I visit her 
surgery, I know Y as a policeman and know how to treat him when we 
meet in the street. There are many other types too — soldiers and 
businesswomen, Germans and Chinese, and indeed men and women. 
These are people with whom we only share the same time, he called 
Nebenmenschen, translated as ‘contemporaries’. 
So what happened as monks lived longer and longer among one 
group of laity was just that they grew closer to them, coming to know 
them, not as a contemporaries who relate to them as a 
contemporaries, not laity relating to monks, but as individuals known 
increasingly to each other by their name, their sight, their stories and 
their needs and vulnerabilities. 
They became familiars to one another. 
And it is just this tendency, the growing together of people through 
long and longer association, that represents the independently causal 
force of sociality. In the assembling of the Institute, that potential or 
propensity of sociality was well harnessed by Jinavamsa and 
colleagues, so that their rhetorical efforts would draw people to them 
in a carefully monitored and described form. In other words, the 
Institute was composed through a careful process of keeping relations 
between monks and laity, and indeed between monks, within the 
bounds of a formality that Schütz would have recognised as one 
between contemporaries. Once released into the wild, so to speak, the 
monks of the Institute were exposed to the force of more or less 
unbridled sociality, a magnetic process which reveals human sociality 
as being, on occasion, much more that just a propensity or a potential. 
Affection, mutual regard, and mutual care grow naturally, in effect, 
even when a person so disciplined and constrained as a forest monk 
meets his fellow human beings and comes to know their stories and 
needs among the vicissitudes of life. 
In the longer run, I have argued — though not in this vocabulary and 
long before I began thinking about sociality or heard of Schütz —, that 
this process of the monk coming to know the layman, so that they are 
no longer facing one another in their roles but in their individualities, 
as the Venerable Ananda, say, facing Punchi Banda, is a powerful 
driving force, among others, in the Sangha’s domestication. And in a 
larger view the attractive potential in sociality can be a spanner in the 
works of, well, all sorts of Fordist industrial institutions, and indeed in 
any institution that seeks to maintain itself through neatly delineated 
roles and scripts. Some of us may also speak of this from personal 
experience, for as a pupil in school one may sometimes fail dismally in 
relation to teachers because of the intensity of sociality with other 
pupils. (Frank Sanchez and especially Michael Carrithers used to get in 
terrible trouble, messing around in class.) 
On the other hand, powerfully attracting sociality can become a 
vital force in the maintenance and prospering of institutions. Thus 
armies are known to work best when they  consist of units each of 
which is a ‘band of brothers’. And this is true of the Institute as well. 
Thus at one of the remotest forest hermitages associated with the 
Institute, Kudumbigala, the chief monk there, the Venerable 
Anandasiri, and his fellows maintained a spirit of lively awareness of 
each other’s needs and circumstances. In this he found echoes, too, in 
one of his favourite Pali scriptures, which reads thus, in the words of 
the monk in whose mouth the sentiment is placed: 
 
I am disposed in mind, speech, and body to acts of loving-
kindness towards [my fellow monks], whether openly or in secret. 
Hence we each think: why not give up my own will, and act by the 
will of those venerable colleagues? And we do so. Our bodies are 
several, Sir, but our mind is surely one. (For the reference see 
Carrithers 1983:287.) 
 
It is difficult for an ethnographer, even one so kindly and openly 
treated as I was by the monks of the Institute, to know for certain the 
extent to which this force of sociality, internal to the institution, is at 
work. But insofar as I can make the judgment, it seemed clear to me 
at the time, and now, that there was a general growing-together 
among the monks of the Institute that provided for its longevity and 
relative health. It is far easier to discern sociality as an independent 
causal force, though, when it is exposed between institutions, as it is 
in the relationship between the hermitage monks and the laity. 
 
Concluding 
The concept of sociality has been variously adapted and cultivated 
by different anthropologists and by different sub-disciplines in a larger 
Anthropology. Each has added further detail and explored different 
entailments of the naked idea itself. Thus primatologists have, over 
the years, created a vocabulary of types of primate society, and even, 
gradually, begun to think about the evolution of those types of 
sociality. Within sociocultural anthropology the concept has been 
adapted in two chief forms to solve two very different kinds of 
problem. For Strathern and others, the term’s use has been elaborated 
to explore the face-to-face creation of different forms of personhood 
and association in relatively egalitarian circumstances. I, on the other 
hand, have adopted the idea, from evolutionary biologists, in order to 
create a possible interface with primatology, and simultaneously to 
develop a vocabulary for the capacities which underlie human social 
and cultural inventiveness. In this essay I have tried to create an 
elementary guide through the thicket that the concept is threatening 
to become, at least to sociocultural anthropologists. I have also re-
described those further attributes of human sociality in order to see 
how they support one sort of thing that our sort of animal does, and 
that is, we create institutions. And I have also dealt, I hope 
effectively, with a feature of sociality which appears only on occasion, 
though frequently enough, and that is when it becomes a force which 
counters and erodes human attempts to render institutions predictable 
and controllable. That dimension of sociality I have called a causal 
force, because it seems to live a life of its own, with unforeseeable 
results, working sometimes with, but sometimes against, our species’ 
inventions of purposeful regulation. 
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